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This article presents evidence of name-order effects in balloting from a study of the 1998 Democra-
tic primary in New York City, in which the order of candidates’ names was rotated by precinct. In 71
of 79 individual nominating contests, candidates received a greater proportion of the vote when listed
first than when listed in any other position. In seven of those 71 contests the advantage to first posi-
tion exceeded the winner’s margin of victory, suggesting that ballot position would  have determined
the election outcomes if one candidate had held the top spot in all precincts.
The 2000 presidential election shone a spotlight on a rarely contemplated
aspect of the American political system: ballot design. The format of the ballot
in Palm Beach County, Florida appears to have influenced the outcome of the
2000 presidential election, in violation of (at least) two fundamental principles
of democracy. First, democracy requires a “level playing field” on which no can-
didate holds an a priori advantage over others, particularly one conferred by the
state. In the words of Wand, Herron, and Brady, “Under any reasonable standard
of fairness, ballot format should not determine the outcome of an election” (2000,
G3). Second, the candidate preferred by the most people should win an election.
It is troubling when a candidate who is favored by a plurality of voters loses an
election because the ballot format steers indifferent or confused voters in a par-
ticular direction.
These principles have been discussed ad nauseam in relation to the infamous
“butterfly ballot” and the 2000 presidential election tally in Florida (e.g., Brady
et al. 2001; Wand et al. 2001). They are equally relevant to another aspect of
ballot format, the order in which candidates’ names are listed. Political profes-
sionals have long taken for granted that the top spot on the ballot provides an
advantage to the candidate whose name occupies it. In several instances, candi-
dates have brought lawsuits to prevent their incumbent opponents from enjoying
this advantage.1 Still, most states assign one candidate in every primary election
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1 Holtzman v. Power, 62 Misc. 2d 1020; Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661; Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F.
Supp. at 1059.
the top spot instead of rotating the order of candidates’ names.2 If the conven-
tional wisdom of the politerati is correct, this practice creates an obvious inequity
in many American elections.
In this article we test the notion that election results are influenced by the order
in which candidates’ names appear on the ballot. Specifically, we consider
whether occupying the first position on a vertical primary ballot adds to candi-
dates’ vote tallies. We do this through a quantitative analysis of election results
from the 1998 Democratic primary in New York City—a jurisdiction that rotates
precinct-by-precinct the order in which candidates’ names are listed on the
primary ballots.
Our findings differ from the most recent and widely cited article on name-order
effects. We strongly disagree with Miller and Krosnick’s conclusion that the mag-
nitude of name-order effects are not substantively significant (1998, 291–92). We
argue that Miller and Krosnick overstate the implications of their study, which
only considers general elections. We find that the effect of name order on primary
election outcomes is significantly larger than Miller and Krosnick’s estimate for
general elections; furthermore, the magnitude of name-order effects is large
enough to turn the outcome in some races. This phenomenon may not adversely
affect any particular class of citizens, but it undermines equality among individ-
ual candidates. This is no less offensive to the democratic principle of fair play
than, say, a state program that would provide a single candidate in each election
contest—determined by lottery—with a cash grant.
Previous Studies of Name-Order Effects
The study of name-order effects predates Miller and Krosnick’s coining of the
term, but most of the earlier studies are methodologically flawed (for a detailed
critique of the literature, see Miller and Krosnick 1998, 295–97). Furthermore,
the literature is contradictory, with no clear patterns in the findings across studies.
The existing work considers a wide variety of electoral contexts, including pri-
maries for several offices in Michigan (Bain and Hecock 1957), Democratic and
Republican county central committees in California (Byrne and Pueschel 1974),
elections up and down the ballot in two Colorado counties (Darcy 1986), primary
contests for local office in Oregon (Elverum 1983), all offices in contention in
the 1992 general election in Ohio (Miller and Krosnick 1998), Los Angeles Junior
College Board (Mueller 1970), Ohio state senate primaries (White 1950), 
and, perhaps least significant but most amusing, the election of officers of the
American Anthropological Association in 1951 (Gold 1952). (A survey of the
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2 Only 14 states rotate candidate name order in statewide primary elections; two more (New York
and Kentucky) use rotation in some jurisdictions but not others. In the remaining 36 states, the order
of candidates’ names is uniform on all ballots, determined either by alphabetic ordering or lottery. A
complete list of ballot placement methods, with references to the relevant sections of state election
codes, is available at http://www2.bc.edu/~steenje/ballot.htm or from the authors upon request.
ballot position literature, including studies of voting in international settings, is
presented in Darcy and McAllister 1990.)
Miller and Krosnick offer the most recent addition to the name-order effects
literature with their 1998 article on the 1992 general election in Ohio. They
outline a compelling theory of name-order effects and find evidence of wide-
spread position effect in the 1992 Ohio general election.
We embrace the theory of name-order effects developed by Krosnick and his
collaborators (see Krosnick and Alwin 1987; Miller and Krosnick 1998) that
draws upon Simon’s (1957) “satisficing” principle and treats voting as a cogni-
tive task. According to the theory, actors faced with a choice among alternatives
will conserve resources and select the most accessible satisfactory option pre-
sented, even if it is not optimal. If choices are presented orally, as in a telephone
interview, the last option presented is most accessible and a “recency effect” is
expected; if choices are presented visually, as in an election ballot, the first option
presented is most accessible and a “primacy effect” is expected. As Miller and
Krosnick note, “if a citizen feels compelled to vote in races regarding which he
or she has no substantive bases for choice at all, he or she may simply settle for
the first name listed, because no reason is apparent suggesting that the candidate
is unacceptable” (1998, 294–95). Thus they predict that the magnitude of posi-
tion bias depends on how many voters do not have substantive bases for choice.
We see one important shortcoming in Miller and Krosnick’s study, their inter-
pretation of their own findings.3 Miller and Krosnick find that name-order effects
are statistically significant, but substantively insignificant. They conclude, “the
magnitude of name-order effects observed here suggests that they have probably
done little to undermine the democratic process in contemporary America” (1998,
291–92). We believe that this optimistic conclusion is premature.
Even as they dismiss the potential mischief of name-order effects, Miller and
Krosnick point out that name-order effects are stronger in nonpartisan elections:
“these effects were smaller when a cue was available to help people cast sub-
stantively meaningful votes” (1998, 312). Yet their study does not reveal anything
about the magnitude of name-order effects in a large, important class of elections
in which partisan cues are unavailable to voters, partisan primaries.
The importance of primary elections for democracy should not be minimized.
In many jurisdictions one major party enjoys a clear advantage over the other, so
the only potential venue for meaningful competition is the dominant party’s
primary (Herrnson 2000, 24; Jacobson 2001, 16). Perhaps more significantly, pri-
maries shape the alternatives that will ultimately be presented to the voters in
elections for major offices, including, for example, U.S. Senate and Governor in
the nation’s third most populous state (as in this study).Consequently, one cannot
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3 Miller and Krosnick also make one methodological error: in their statistical analysis they fail to
weight each observation by the size of the precinct. This may not be a serious flaw if the precincts
studied were of roughly uniform size, but we cannot judge that since Miller and Krosnick do not
report any information about the number of voters represented in their study.
judge the extent to which assigning the top slot to a single candidate undermines
the democratic process without determining how ballot position affects outcomes
in primary elections.
Data and Method
For this study we analyzed precinct-level election results from the 1998 Demo-
cratic primary in New York City.4 While candidate name-order is uniform across
most of New York State, in New York City the names of candidates are rotated
by precinct.5 That is, each candidate for each office is listed first in a nearly equal
number of small precincts. This procedure produces observational data that is as
close to experimental as one can get without actually randomizing the assign-
ment of ballot formats, thereby providing an exceptional opportunity to examine
the electoral consequences of ballot position.
In 1998, there were 79 contested Democratic primary elections in the City of
New York. The contested offices included Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
Attorney General, U.S. Senator, U.S. Representative (three districts), New York
State Senator (five districts), New York State Assembly (21 districts), and Civil
Court Judge (four contests). There were also four Democratic Party offices in con-
tention: Male District Leader (16 districts), Female District Leader (12 districts),
State Committeeman (eight districts), and State Committeewoman (six districts).
Election administration is organized around State Assembly districts, each of
which is divided into precincts.6 New York City has, in total, 5,616 precincts dis-
tributed across 58 Assembly Districts (ADs). The average number of precincts
per Assembly District is 92, and the average number of voters per precinct is
about 83.7
The assignment of precincts to ballot formats is not strictly random. Each
Assembly District is divided into geographically contiguous, sequentially num-
bered precincts. However, it would be bizarre indeed if the characteristics of a
precinct were related to that precinct’s number. Precincts reported an average of
81.4 votes in 1998, thus neighborhoods in which voters shared characteristics
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4 The basic unit of election administration is called an “election district” in New York City, but to
avoid confusion with legislative districts we refer to them here as “precincts.”
5 The peculiar dual system resulted from a political compromise that stemmed out a court decision
invalidating a 1970 statute that had granted the first ballot position to incumbent office holders (Holtz-
man v. Power, Court of Appeals of New York, 27 N.Y.2d 628; 261 N.E.2d 666; 1970). In its place,
the state legislature imposed the rotation system. But since the “incumbent-first” rule applied only in
New York City, the change to the rotation system was applied only in New York City. As a result, all
primary elections conducted in New York City—even those for statewide office—rotate the order in
which candidates’ names are listed.
6 Each of the five boroughs of New York City (Queens, Brooklyn, Staten Island, Manhattan, and
the Bronx) is a distinct county; the Assembly Districts do not cross county lines.
7 Our data include neither total registered voters nor total ballots cast in each ED, so we approxi-
mate the number of “voters” as the maximum number of individual ballots cast for any single office.
For 70% of precincts, that office is U.S. Senate.
(e.g., race, ethnicity) were never presented a single ballot format. Furthermore,
if some characteristic is shared by the population of, say, every third precinct in
a given Assembly district, that characteristic would only confound results for
races with three candidates. Only the rotation of candidates in a three-person race
would align with the mysterious characteristic associated with every third
precinct.8
Our statistical analysis is very simple, but somewhat unconventional. It is cus-
tomary to consider individual candidates as the recipients of votes; instead, we
considered ballot positions as recipients of votes, regardless of whose name
appears in them. When candidate names are rotated, each slot on the ballot (the
first, second, third, or fourth position) is occupied by each candidate in the same
number of precincts. Each slot should therefore receive one nth of the votes in
an n-candidate primary if ballot placement exerts no effect on candidate per-
formance. For example, in a four-person contest, such as the race for Attorney
General, each position should receive 25% of the vote in the absence of position
effect.9 The sampling distribution of the vote under the null hypothesis is there-
fore very straightforward: the expected vote percent for first position (or any 
other), p, is 1/n and the standard error is , where P is the number of
observed precincts.10 Using these parameters we conducted standard Z-tests on
the observed percentages for first position.
Findings
We found compelling evidence that ballot position affects candidates’ vote
tallies. Our findings also confirm that several variables contribute to the magni-
tude of position effect.
Table 1 presents the tallies for each statewide office by ballot position. For all
three statewide races with four candidates, the first position received significantly
more than 25% of the votes. In the Governor’s race, the first position took 27.3%
of the vote. In the Attorney General’s race, the first position received 27.2%, and
in the U.S. Senate campaign the first position received 26.8%. In the Lieutenant
p p1 -( )
P
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8 It would be desirable to use demographic variables to test for qualitative differences among the
groups of precincts sharing ballot formats. Unfortunately, the only level for which we have demo-
graphic data is congressional district, and there is insufficient covariation between congressional dis-
trict and ballot format to use census variables to evaluate differences between formats.
9 There are slight variations in the proportion of precincts with each ballot format when one ballot
format appeared in extra precincts, as when the number of precincts is not a whole multiple of the
number of candidates or when a district lies in two counties. There are also slight variations in the
proportion of total voters with each format, since the number of voters per precinct is not uniform.
However, when we accounted for these variations our results were nearly identical to those presented
here.
10 Since precincts contain varying numbers of voters (the mean is 76 and standard deviation is 54),
we weighted each observation by the number of total votes cast in the precinct.
Governor’s race, with only three candidates, the first position took 34.9% of the
vote. In all four primaries, the vote for candidates in the first position signifi-
cantly exceeded the position-neutral expectation of 1/n, with p-values less than
.001 in two cases (Governor and Attorney General) and less than .01 in two 
(Lieutenant Governor and U.S. Senator).
The results of our analysis leave no room for doubt regarding the existence of
position effect. In all four of the statewide contests, the first position fared better
than the other ballot positions. We can very confidently reject the null hypothe-
sis of no position bias in primaries for statewide office.
In elections for local office, including Congress, state legislature, judgeships,
and four party positions, the primacy effect is substantively larger, although in
many cases not statistically significant.11 Table 2 lists the vote percentage by posi-
tion for the 75 contested primary elections at the local level. In 67 of the 75, the
first position received more than its expected percentage of the vote. The median
advantage to first position in down-ballot elections was 3.6%; the first-position
effect ranged from -10.6% to 11.4%. Despite the high threshold for statistical
significance, we found that in 17 of the 75 local races the first position vote was
significantly higher than the expectation.
These observations are not mutually independent because there are many
instances of overlapping districts. We only have one unique observation per
precinct, but, for example, in the 54th Assembly district, precincts 30 and 31 con-
tributed to the tallies in the contest primaries for two judgeships, U.S. House (10th
CD), State Senate (17th SD), Assembly, Male District Leader, and Female 
District Leader (all AD 54). To evaluate the joint significance of these findings,
we created four precinct-level variables, votes for all down-ballot candidates in
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TABLE 1
Percentage of vote for candidates in each position, statewide primaries
Number of
Total votes precincts AdvantageBallot Position
cast for with votes for to first
1 2 3 4 this office this office position
Governor 27.3% 24.0% 23.5% 25.3% 427,871 5,460 2.3%***
U.S. Senator 26.8% 25.1% 24.0% 24.0% 444,410 5,460 1.8%**
Lt. Governor 34.9% 33.3% 31.8% 305,331 5,442 1.6%**
Atty. General 27.2% 25.2% 23.9% 23.7% 395,820 5,456 2.2%***
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
11 Because there are fewer observations per contest in local nominations the sampling distribution
of the position vote is “flatter”—that is to say, it has a larger standard error. The statistical test for
local offices is considerably more powerful, so one would not expect the results to be as dramatic, in
terms of p-values, as those in the statewide contests, even if the magnitude of effect is the same or
greater.
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first position, votes for all such candidates in second position, votes for candi-
dates in third position and votes for candidates in fourth position. We then created
four more variables, the expected votes for each position given no positional
effect. For each ballot position, this benchmark was calculated as:
Using these computed figures, we were able to calculate both an observed and
an expected vote percent, assume a sampling distribution for each ballot slot, and
test whether the observed percent were significantly greater than the expected
percent. The benchmark expectation is that 45.4% of all votes in down-ballot
races should be cast for first position.12 In reality, 47.9% of all votes were cast
for first position. Given the expectation of 45.4% and 3,836 individual precincts,
the probability of observing 47.9% or more is less than .001.13
Position Effect and Candidate Advantage
We have discussed name-order bias in the abstract, referring to positions
instead of candidates, for the sake of quantitative analysis but this should not
obscure the fact that the beneficiaries of first-position effect are individual can-
didates. All 12 statewide candidates received “extra” votes when listed first. The
political implications of position effect may be more vividly demonstrated by
shifting our attention briefly to results by candidate.
Among the 180 candidates in contested primaries, 161 received a larger per-
centage of the vote when listed first. Table 3 lists the vote tally for the statewide
candidates in our dataset, by the order in which their names appeared on the
ballot.14 For example, Catherine Abate, a Democratic candidate for Attorney
General, received 27.1% of the total vote, but when listed first she captured
29.3%. The boost for individual candidates ranged from -11.6% to 14.5%, with
an average of 3.4%, as depicted in Figure 1.
Inspecting the by-candidate results revealed one of the most important aspects
of our findings: in seven of the 79 contests, the first-position advantage exceeded
the margin of victory. That is to say, the first-position effect was large enough to
change the outcome of the election. One of those elections was the hotly con-
tested primary to succeed Chuck Schumer in the U.S. House of Representatives.15
Expected vote
Total votes cast for all candidates in contest
Number of candidates in contesti
 
        




12 More details about how we calculated the observed and expected votes are available at
http://www2.bc.edu/~steenje/ballot.htm, or from the authors upon request.
13 N = 3,836 instead of 5,616 (the total number of precincts in New York City) because there were
no contested Democratic primaries below the statewide offices in 1,780 precincts.
14 Vote tallies for local candidates are available at http://www2.bc.edu/~steenje/ballot.htm or from
the authors upon request.
15 The others were both district-level civil court judge nominations and four elections to Democ-
ratic party offices (Male District Leader for the 36th Assembly district, Male District Leader for the
37th Assembly district, State Committeeman from the 74th Assembly district, and State Committee-
woman from the 31st Assembly district).



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The estimated position effect was 2.1%, and the winner’s margin of victory was
just 1.1%. On ballots on which Melinda Katz was listed first, Katz prevailed with
3,575 votes and her nearest opponent, Anthony Weiner, received 3,282. When
Weiner was listed first, he received 3,729 votes to Katz’ 3,110. Weiner won the
primary (with a margin of less than 500 votes out of 45,113 cast), but if the ballots
had not been rotated and Katz had drawn the top slot, it is probable that she, not
Weiner, would now be a Member of Congress.
Variations in Name Order Effect
The effect of ballot position on election outcomes is not uniform across 
contests. According to Miller and Krosnick’s theory, these variations may be
explained in part by variations in voters’ information about the candidates, ergo
their substantive bases for choosing among options. With more information
regarding the candidates, voters are less likely to be influenced by the position
of the names because they are more likely to enter the booth with preformed
intent to vote for one candidate or another.
Voters are more likely to have some information upon which to base a deci-
sion in the more prominent contests either because they seek out information or
the contests feature more vigorously waged campaigns that include television
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FIGURE 1





























































commercials, direct mail, street campaigning, and significant news coverage.
Candidates for Governor and U.S. Senator naturally receive much more media
attention and advertise themselves more than do candidates for state central com-
mittee. Voters may also seek out information about the top-of-the-ticket races
because they perceive these contests as more important.
As an indirect indicator of salience we use the relative ballot placement of
blocks of candidates for the same office.16 Figure 2 presents the average position
effect by office, depicting a clear trend of increasing position effect with decreas-
ing prominence of the office sought. In the four statewide primaries position bias
is roughly 2%, while in the local party offices it is almost 4%.
Conclusion
In this article, we have clearly demonstrated the existence of position effect on
a wide range of contests in the 1998 Democratic primary in New York City. The
evidence leaves little doubt regarding this phenomenon. Moreover, we conclude
the effect—while it may appear small—can be determinative in close contests.
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FIGURE 2
















































































































































16 Furthermore, offices are listed in the ballot in roughly the order of salience to the electorate, so
if cognitive fatigue is a factor in position effect, the down-ballot races would be more susceptible.
This offends democratic notions that all candidates should compete on a level
playing field.
Those who accept lotteries or alphabetic ordering for ballot position as an
unavoidable part of our election system should reconsider this acceptance of the
status quo. If a jurisdiction with as many simultaneously contested elections as
New York City—and 14 states—can successfully carry out rotation, there is no
reason other election officials could not do the same across the country.
Of course, the problem of position effect does not exist in a vacuum. While
rotation of candidate names would certainly solve the position effect problem, 
it could frustrate some other practices intended to make voting easier. Most
obvious, printing accurate sample ballots for each voter would be almost impos-
sible. Congress is encouraging states to provide sample ballots to reduce the like-
lihood of problems such as those experienced by Florida voters in 2000 (Seelye
2001). Indeed, some jurisdictions legally require production of a ballot facsimile
that exactly reproduces the actual ballot (e.g., Fla. Stat. §101.20 (2001)). This
could prove challenging were rotation also implemented.
Some of the proposed changes that have emerged in the wake of the 2000 
election would, however, be entirely consistent with rotation. Electronic voting
technologies—especially those that employ a screen-based display of candidate
names—would, in fact, make rotation much easier. Such a device could rotate
candidate names by voter. That could eliminate position effect and provide ter-
rific data to political scientists who study this phenomenon in the future.
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